Additional Info: Fw: OpenSSL 0.9.7a and 0.9.6i released

Thu Feb 20 10:39:09 GMT 2003

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 ________________________________________________________________________

 OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
 http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
 openpkg-security at openpkg.org                         openpkg at openpkg.org
 OpenPKG-SA-2003.013                                          19-Feb-2003
 ________________________________________________________________________

 Package:             openssl
 Vulnerability:       obtain plaintext of SSL/TLS communication
 OpenPKG Specific:    no

 Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:        Corrected Packages:
 OpenPKG CURRENT      <= openssl-0.9.7-20030111 >= openssl-0.9.7a-20030219
 OpenPKG 1.2          <= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.0    >= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1
 OpenPKG 1.1          <= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.0   >= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.1

 Affected Releases:   Dependent Packages:

 OpenPKG CURRENT      apache cadaver cpu curl dsniff easysoap ethereal
                      exim fetchmail imap imapd inn linc links lynx mico
                      mixmaster mozilla mutt nail neon openldap openvpn
                      perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail
                      siege sio sitecopy socat stunnel subversion sysmon
                      w3m wget

 OpenPKG 1.2          apache cpu curl ethereal fetchmail imap inn
                      links lynx mico mutt nail neon openldap perl-ssl
                      postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail siege
                      sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m wget

 OpenPKG 1.1          apache curl fetchmail inn links lynx mutt neon
                      openldap perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba
                      siege sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m

 Description:
   In an upcoming CRYPTO 2003 paper, Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain
   Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL,
   Ilion) describe and demonstrate a timing-based attack on SSL/TLS
   with CBC ciphersuites. According to an OpenSSL security advisory
   [0], the OpenSSL implementation is vulnerable to this attack. The
   Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
   CAN-2003-0078 [2] to the problem.

   The attack assumes that multiple SSL/TLS connections involve a common
   fixed plaintext block, such as a password. An active attacker can
   substitute specifically made-up ciphertext blocks for blocks sent
   by legitimate SSL/TLS parties and measure the time until a response
   arrives. SSL/TLS includes data authentication to ensure that such
   modified ciphertext blocks will be rejected by the peer (and the
   connection aborted), but the attacker may be able to use timing
   observations to distinguish between two different error cases, namely
   block cipher padding errors and MAC verification errors.

   This is sufficient for an adaptive attack that finally can obtain the
   complete plaintext block. Although this cannot be easily exploited,
   because the attack requires the ability to be a man-in-the-middle,
   repeated communications that have a common plaintext block, decoding
   failures not signaling problems on the client and server side, and
   a network between the attacker and the server sufficient enough to
   reasonably observe timing differences.

   OpenSSL version since 0.9.6c supposedly treat block cipher padding
   errors like MAC verification errors during record decryption [1], but
   MAC verification was still skipped after detection of a padding error,
   which allowed the timing attack.

   Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
   openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version
   is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
   (see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any, too.
   [3][4]

 Solution:
   Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
   [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
   location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
   from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
   RPM [4]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
   operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
   adjust accordingly).

   $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
   ftp> bin
   ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
   ftp> get openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.src.rpm
   ftp> bye
   $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.src.rpm
   $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.src.rpm
   $ su -
   # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.*.rpm

   Additionally, we recommend that you rebuild and reinstall
   all dependent packages (see above), if any, too. [3][4]
 ________________________________________________________________________

 References:
   [0] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030219.txt
   [1] http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
   [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0078
   [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
   [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
   [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.1.src.rpm
   [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.src.rpm
   [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
   [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
   [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
 ________________________________________________________________________

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 ________________________________________________________________________